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High-speed, or broadband, access to the Internet is becoming ubiquitous, but some 
policymakers are concerned that broadband penetration in the United States is increasing too 
slowly, especially compared to other countries.  As a result, cities, states, and the federal 
government are adopting policies intended to quicken broadband growth.  These policies include 
attempts to streamline rights-of-way laws, telecommunications unbundling regulations, 
subsidies, and direct municipal broadband provision.  To date, however, little empirical research 
has explored whether these policies, especially at the state level, are effective. 
 
In this paper I combine data from several publicly-available sources to test the effects of 
a number of policies.  The analysis reveals that most state-level policies are ineffective.   
Universal service mechanisms and programs targeted at “underserved” areas do not boost 
broadband penetration and may even slow it, possibly by giving an artificial advantage to one 
type of provider over another.  Likewise, tax incentives appear to have no impact.  Laws limiting 
municipal deployment of broadband are not statistically significantly correlated with broadband 
penetration.  Other policies, however, do appear to affect broadband penetration.  Access to 
public rights-of-way by broadband providers is strongly correlated with penetration.  Telecom 
unbundling regulations also affect penetration: the share of telephone lines provided under UNE-
P regulations is negatively correlated with penetration, but resold lines are positively correlated 
with it.  Some programs targeting rural access may have some positive impact.  Subsidies from 
USDA’s Rural Development broadband program are not correlated with increased rural access to 
broadband, but subsidies from USDA’s broader telecommunications program are, though the 
analysis suggests that it is probably not a cost effective way to increase broadband access. 1 
Broadband Penetration: 






High-speed access to the Internet, or broadband, is becoming ubiquitous.  At the same 
time,  some  policymakers  and  others  are  concerned  that  the  United  States  is  not  adopting 
broadband fast enough (e.g., Ferguson 2002; Hundt 2002).  In 2004, the U.S. ranked tenth in the 
world in terms of broadband adoption per capita, and many agreed with President Bush when he 
noted that “Tenth is 10 spots too low.”
1 According to the International Telecommunications 
Union, by the beginning of 2005 the U.S. had fallen to 16th in broadband penetration.
2  Others 
argue that such rankings are not meaningful and that Americans are adopting broadband at least 
as  swiftly  as  previous  new  technologies  (Crandall  2004a;  Faulhaber  2002).    Regardless  of 
whether broadband is, in fact, growing “too slowly,” universal broadband adoption could yield 
significant economic benefits (Crandall and Jackson 2001; Crandall, et al. 2002; Litan and Rivlin 
2001).  As a result, there has been a great deal of interest in policies that might encourage faster 
adoption of broadband Internet connections. 
Policies intended to accelerate broadband adoption have included telephone line-sharing 
and unbundling regulations, subsidies for private providers and consumers, direct government 
provision of broadband services, and attempts to streamline access to public rights-of-way, to 
name a few.  Many of these policies, described in more detail below, are undertaken at the state 
or city level.  Indeed, every state regulates telecommunications, and these regulations can greatly 
affect  the  industry  (Kim  and  Buckley  2004).    Unfortunately,  it  is  difficult  to  collect 
comprehensive data on state-level policies.  As a result, little empirical research focuses on the 
effectiveness of state-level broadband policies. 
                                                 
1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040426-6.html 
2 Behind Hong Kong, South Korea, The Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, Switzerland, Taiwan, Belgium, Iceland, 
Sweden, Norway, Israel, Japan, Finland, and Singapore. 2 
In  this  paper  I  evaluate  state-level  data  to  assess  the  impacts  of  policies  at  the  sub-
national  level  on  broadband  adoption.
3    In  particular,  I  combine  data  from  the  Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), information on state-level policies recently compiled by 
the  California  Public  Utilities  Commission  (PUC)  (2005),  and  data  from  a  variety  of  other 
publicly-available  sources  to  test  the  effects  of  rights-of-way  regulations,  subsidies,  direct 
government support for broadband rollout, and unbundling regulations.  These data limit the 
rigor of the analysis.  For example, I do not have information on the size of various state policies 
or when they began.  In addition, while the state-level data shows broadband subscriptions per 
capita, the rural data shows only the share of a state’s rural population that lives in zip codes with 
at least one provider.  Nonetheless, the analysis provides a first empirical look at policies that are 
becoming increasingly popular. 
Controlling for population, income, urbanization, venture capital, the governor’s political 
party, and year fixed-effects, I find that guaranteed access to rights-of-way is strongly correlated 
with improvements in broadband penetration while universal service mechanisms and programs 
targeted  at  “underserved”  areas  do  not  appear  to  improve  penetration  and  may  even  be 
detrimental to it.  The share of telephone lines provided as UNE lines is correlated with slower 
growth in ADSL service, while the share of lines provided through resale programs is correlated 
with faster growth in ADSL and total broadband penetration.  State laws restricting the ability of 
municipalities to build broadband networks are not significantly correlated with penetration. 
Some programs intended to improve rural access may have  a positive impact.  State 
grants supposedly targeted at rural areas are positively correlated with increased total broadband 
penetration, though not consistently significant across specifications.  On the federal level, the 
USDA Rural Development broadband program is not correlated with changes in rural access to 
broadband.    USDA’s  broader  telecommunications  program,  however,  is  correlated  with 
increased rural broadband access, but the analysis suggests that it spends about $1500 per person 




                                                 
3 A related question is how access differs by race  and income—the so-called  “digital divide.”  Prieger (2003) 
evaluates this question in detail and finds little evidence for this aspect of the digital divide. 3 
2. Broadband Growth and the Desire for More 
 
High-speed connections to the Internet started to become commonplace in the late 1990s.   
One of the first technologies widely available to residential and small business consumers was 
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), which allowed existing telephone lines to transmit 
data faster than could traditional dialup modems.  Just like today’s concerns that government 
should do more to speed broadband rollout, then there were calls for faster ISDN rollout.  The 
Texas  PUC,  for  example,  required  Southwestern  Bell  Telephone  Company  to  make  ISDN 
available to all Texas consumers (Common Carrier Bureau 1998).  In 1997, one consumer group 
called for ISDN price controls because “the best available here-and-now residential technology is 
ISDN”  and  “if  new  technologies  like  cable  modems  or  ADSL  are  truly  seven  years  from 
widespread deployment, we must do something about the present” (Love 1997). 
As  it  turned  out,  ISDN  was  a  fairly  short-lived  technology  that  was  expensive  and 
relatively slow, supporting speeds only up to 128 Kbps, or about three times as fast as a dialup 
modem.  ADSL and cable modems were just around the corner and could provide faster speeds 
at lower costs than could ISDN.  As Figure 1 shows, broadband penetration in the United States 
accelerated dramatically as ADSL and  cable modems became available.  Today, ADSL and 
cable  are  the  primary  means  of  delivering  broadband  Internet  services,  but  other  modes  are 
developing rapidly, including wireless via WiFi and WiMax, satellite, and over power lines. 
Despite this fast growth and emerging new technologies, some policymakers and others 
worry that broadband adoption in the United States is lagging.
4  This concern, plus the benefits 
that  might  accrue  from  increased  access  to  broadband,  have  caused  federal,  state,  and  local 
policymakers  to  search  for  ways  to  increase  penetration.    State  and  local  policies  include 
attempts at streamlining rights-of-way regulations, direct subsidies for broadband providers or 
consumers,  and  government  ownership  of  broadband  infrastructure.    Some  other  policies 
originate  at  the  federal  level  but  differ  across  states.    Telecommunications  unbundling 
regulations,  for  example,  were  initially  mandated  by  the  FCC  as  part  of  the  1996 
Telecommunications  Act,  but  prices  for  the  unbundled  elements  of  the  telecommunications 
                                                 
4 Not only is the percentage of U.S. residents with broadband connections lower than in many other counties, as 
discussed above, but in some other countries it is possible to subscribe to services several times faster than those 
available in the U.S.  In Japan, for example, it is possible to obtain connections as fast as 100 Mbps, compared to 4 
infrastructure  were  generally  set  by  state  regulators.    In  addition,  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Agriculture  (USDA)  Rural  Development  program  provides  local  grants  for  a  variety  of 
development  initiatives,  including  about  $1  billion  per  year  for  investments  in 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
Despite the large number of broadband initiatives and the continued call for new ones, 
there is little empirical analysis of their effectiveness.  Aron and  Burnstein (2003) find that 
competition between providers is an effective catalyst for increased penetration, and argue that 
policies should thus focus on removing obstacles to competition.  Goolsbee (2002) argues that if 
policymakers  want  to  employ  subsidies  to  increase  broadband  penetration,  then  subsidies 
targeted  at  encouraging  investment  in  unserved  areas  will  be  more  effective  than  subsidies 
targeted  at  individual  consumers.    Flamm  (2005)  finds  that  geographic  terrain,  income,  and 
population  density  are  important  determinants  of  broadband  penetration,  while  the  eRate 
program,  intended  to  help  connect  schools  and  libraries  to  the  internet,  has  little  impact  on 
broadband penetration  His empirical results find significant state fixed effects, suggesting that 
state-level policies might matter, though he does not test them.  Faulhaber (2002) notes that state 
and  local  policies  can  also  impede  broadband  rollout  by,  for  example,  imposing  costly 
requirements on infrastructure providers.  Crandall, et al. (2004) agree that state policies can 
affect broadband investment and should be sure not to inhibit competition. 
In this paper I combine data from a number of publicly-available sources to test the 
effects of a variety of policies on broadband adoption.  Below I discuss the data and data sources, 
specific policies and what research has found to date, the framework for analyzing the data, and 
the results. 
 
3. Broadband Policies 
 
One of the challenges in analyzing sub-national policies is that data are rarely collected at 
this level in a systematic fashion.  Fortunately, several recent reports have done just that, making 
it possible to combine information on state policies with detailed FCC and Census data to test the 
effects of those policies on broadband adoption.  In particular, in May 2005 the California Public 
                                                                                                                                                            
services in the U.S. that typically offer download speeds from 1 Mbps or less to 8 Mbps.  I do not address the issue 
of speed in this paper. 5 
Utilities Commission (PUC) released a report on broadband in California, and in an appendix 
notes  which  states  have  adopted  particular  policies  (California  Public  Utilities  Commission 
2005).
5  The Department of Commerce provides information on rights-of-way regulations.
6  The 
USDA Rural Development agency provides state-level data on subsidies for rural broadband and 
telecommunications.    The  FCC  has  data  on  telecommunications  unbundling  and  broadband 
penetration. 
 
Rights of Way 
Extending  or  improving  broadband  service  often  involves  adding  fiber  optic  cables, 
upgrading ‘last mile’ connections, or finding places to locate antennae for wireless services.  
Building this infrastructure usually requires access to public (and private) rights-of-way.  The 
California  PUC  and  the  National  Association  of  Regulatory  Utility  Commissioners  have 
identified access to rights-of-way as one of the most vexing problems facing broadband rollout 
(California Public Utilities Commission 2005; Study Committee on Public Rights-of-Way 2002). 
The desire of states and cities to regulate access to rights-of-way is understandable.  The 
costs of digging up streets, for example, exceed the simple costs of digging, laying cable, and 
filling  holes.    The  process  can  also  disrupt  traffic  and  inconvenience  local  residents—
externalities that may not be internalized absent regulation.  The California PUC notes, however, 
that  “[t]he  process  for  obtaining  Right  of  Way  permits  for  construction  of  broadband 
infrastructure in California is lengthy, expensive, inconsistent and is cited as one of the most 
significant  barriers  to  broadband  deployment.    Rights-of-way  permits  are  issued  by  various 
agencies—federal, state and local agencies, as well as tribal governments—to build broadband 
infrastructure  on  property  controlled  by  those  agencies.    There  is  no  consistency  in  the 
application form or process, or in the permitting criteria or fees” (California Public Utilities 
Commission 2005).  While some regulations regarding access to rights-of-way are necessary, 
arbitrary complexities and differences across jurisdictions can increase the costs of improving 
existing broadband connections or adding new service. 
                                                 
5 Analysys Consulting (2003) prepared similar tables, but unlike the California PUC report, their tables do not 
include all 50 states plus the District of Columbia.  
6  See http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/staterow/rowtableexcel.htm.  The NTIA notes that they assembled the data 
“with reliance on existing research by NARUC and NATOA.” 6 
The complexity of rights-of-way regulations also makes it difficult to create a variable 
that  quantifies  access  to  rights-of-way.    Many  states,  however,  have  laws  guaranteeing 
telecommunications  companies  access  to  rights-of-way.    While  telecommunications  firms 
obviously gain access to public rights-of-way in states without such laws and telecom firms in 
states  with  these  laws  still  must  deal  with  municipalities  regarding  fees  and  other  details,  I 
believe it is reasonable to assume that this variable indicates states in which it is relatively easier 
for  telecommunications  firms  to  use  public  rights-of-way.      Twenty-one  states  make  such 
guarantees to telecom firms.
7 
Cable  TV  companies  also  require  access  to  rights-of-way  in  order  to  build  their 
infrastructure.  Several of the states that guarantee telecom firms access to public rights-of-way 
exempt cable companies from state-level rights-of-way regulations.  Whether such exemption is 
good  or  bad  for  cable  companies  is  unclear.    Firms  often  benefit  from  being  exempt  from 
regulation.  Indeed, some argue that broadband via coaxial cable grew more quickly than via 
ADSL because telecommunications companies were subject to federal regulations while cable 
companies were not (e.g., Crandall, et al. 2004).  Cable companies, however, are regulated at the 
local level, and being exempt from state regulations regarding rights-of-way may mean that cable 
companies cannot benefit from the laws that guarantee telecom firms rights-of-way access.  Six 
states explicitly exempt cable companies from these regulations. 
 
State-level Broadband Policies 
States and cities are engaged in a number of efforts to stimulate broadband adoption.  The 
California  PUC  (2005)  report  notes  which  states  have  adopted  particular  policies.    Table  1 
reproduces this information to show the number of states that have adopted each of the policies 
catalogued in the report.  The table shows that some policies are ubiquitous and others are less 
common.    Every  state,  for  example,  makes  some  state  services  available  online  hoping  to 
increase both accessibility to those services and demand for broadband.  While online services 
probably reduce transactions costs for citizens when dealing with state or local governments, it 
seems unlikely that online services would increase broadband demand.  Broadband makes it 
                                                 
7  I created a dummy variable indicating whether the state provides such guarantees as indicated by the Department 
of Commerce table available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/staterow/rowtableexcel.htm (last accessed May 
17, 2005).  However, it is not always possible to determine definitively from the table whether telecom firms are 
given these guarantees; a few cases were ambiguous.  To test the robustness of the analysis below, I coded these 7 
easier to transmit large amounts of data in less time—an activity in which most people probably 
do not often engage when dealing with state government services.  At the other extreme, only 
two states attempt to regulate broadband quality.  Unfortunately, the lack of variation across 
states in the use of these two policies means that this empirical analysis cannot evaluate their 
effectiveness. 
Adoption  of  other  policies  varies  much  more  across  states.    Some  states  provide 
subsidies—grants or loans—to providers to expand service to rural or “underserved” areas while 
some provide subsidies directly to consumers.  These subsidies are often in the form of tax 
credits to private providers, and sometimes direct payments to firms or non-profits, for building 
in certain areas. 
Cities sometimes build their own broadband infrastructure, which can range from fiber 
optic  loops  to  citywide  WiFi  networks.    These  practices,  especially  the  latter,  have  been 
controversial.  Proponents claim that such public investments can be a cost-effective way to 
bring broadband to a large number of people.  Opponents claim that these projects primarily 
benefit the relatively wealthy who are likely to have broadband access already and discourage 
investment by broadband providers.  Some states have responded to initiatives like these by 




USDA Rural Development Grants 
The USDA Rural Development agency provides loans and grants intended to “increase 
economic opportunity and improve the quality of life in rural America” (Rural Development 
2005).  In 2004 the agency made more than $14 billion available to rural areas for various 
development projects.  While USDA Rural Development’s largest programs involve electricity, 
nearly $1.4 billion were loans for telecommunications projects in 2004 (up from $700 million in 
2000).  The telecommunications program provides funds for “initial construction, improvement, 
or expansion of telecommunications infrastructure; loans and grants for distance learning and 
telemedicine  initiatives;  and  loans  and  grants  for  the  deployment  of  broadband  services.”  
                                                                                                                                                            
states as 0.5, rather than 0 or 1, and re-ran the analyses.  The results were robust to the change. 
8 In the CPUC report, the variable “Does the state limit municipal deployment of broadband services?" generally 
indicates whether or not there are laws prohibiting municipal entities from providing basic local exchange services 
or whether the state imposes burdensome requirements on municipal providers of communications services. 8 
Projects specifically targeted at broadband have increased from $100 million in 2001 (the first 
year broadband-specific loans were available) to $600 million by 2004. 
According  to  the  USDA  Rural  Development  agency  (2005),  “[s]ince  2001,  Rural 
Development has utilized a variety of loan and loan guarantee programs to provide over $3 
billion  in  funding  and  assist  over  1.3  million  rural  subscribers  in  accessing  new  broadband 
technologies.”    The  USDA’s  claim  notwithstanding,  I  am  not  aware  of  empirical  research 




The  1996  Telecommunications  Act  required  incumbent  telecommunications  firms  to 
lease  their  facilities  to  competitors  under  the  theory  that  incumbents  controlled  monopoly 
“bottlenecks.”  While these unbundling rules were intended primarily to promote competition in 
traditional  telecommunications,  advocates  also  believed  that  they  would  be  important  in 
broadband  adoption  (Frieden  2004).    Research  to  date,  however,  shows  little  impact  of 
unbundling on broadband internationally (e.g., Bauer, et al. 2003; Garcia-Murillo and Gabel 
2003; Hausman and Sidak 2004).
9  Crandall (2004b) notes that broadband penetration in Canada 
is  about  60  percent  higher  than  in  the  U.S.,  and  that  Canada  has  less  onerous  unbundling 
requirements for local telephone companies and virtually no network sharing for competitive 
broadband suppliers. 
Until  2004,  the  FCC  allowed  competitors  to  purchase  all  the  elements  necessary  to 
provide service at regulated rates.   By re-assembling the entire platform under regulated rates 
(called  Unbundled  Network  Element-Platform,  or  UNE-P),  competitors  could  offer  voice 
services  with  little  investment  in  their  own  facilities.    Line  sharing  regulations  allowed 
competitors to provide ADSL service over the incumbent’s copper lines.  In its August 2003 
decision the FCC began moving away from these regulations, loosening some “unbundling” 
requirements,  eliminating  the  right  of  entrants  to  share  the  incumbents’  lines  at  these  low 
                                                 
9 The role of UNE regulations on development of traditional telecommunications has been similarly controversial.  
Some believe they were  crucial in promoting  competition (e.g.,  Clarke, et  al. 2004), while others believe they 
reduced investment incentives and were a total failure (e.g., Hazlett 2005). 9 
prices.
10  And while the FCC wanted to permit states to continue to allow UNE-P, the DC Circuit 
Court reversed that decision, effectively ending the UNE-P regime. 
The FCC provides data on the number of telephone lines by state.  In particular, the 
agency’s annual reports on local telephone competition detail the number of lines by state each 
year,  including  the  share  of  lines  provided  by  competitive  local  exchange  carriers  (CLECs) 
through UNE-P and resale of the incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) facilities.
11  Because 
UNE-P regulations were targeted at voice competition they did not directly affect broadband 
provision.    Those  regulations,  did,  however,  affect  the  incumbent’s  investment  incentives.  
Critics argue that these regulations reduce the returns to ILEC investments, therefore reducing 
their incentive to invest (e.g., Crandall 2005; Hazlett 2005; Hazlett, et al. 2004).  Supporters 
argue that the gains from competition resulting from UNE-P more than offset those disincentives 
(e.g., Clarke, et al. 2004; Ford and Spiwak 2004). 
UNE-P  and  resale  are  similar  in  that  they  both  allow  CLECs  to  sell  local  exchange 
service under their own brand names, but pricing methods are different.  UNE regulated prices 
were supposed to reflect the cost an ILEC would incur to provide each network element, while 
resale prices were supposed to be a discount from retail prices reflecting the ILEC’s avoided 
costs of providing certain customer services.  It was generally less expensive for CLECs to 
provide service through UNE lines, as evidenced by the fast growth of UNE lines as a share of 
all CLEC lines over time (Figure 2). 
 
4. Broadband Data and Analysis 
 
Most of the data on broadband penetration come from the FCC’s annual reports, “High-
Speed Services for Internet Access.”
12  I use three measures of broadband penetration by state 
from  this  source  to  test  the  effects  of  various  policies:  the  total  number  of  broadband 
connections, the number of ADSL connections, and the number of connections over coaxial 
cable. 
                                                 
10 Federal Communications Commission (2003). By this order, the FCC describes: “We eliminate most unbundling 
requirements for broadband, making it easier for companies to invest in new equipment and deploy the high-speed 
services that consumers desire. We have also made new decisions concerning the unbundling of  other network 
elements  that  result  in  substantial  changes  to  existing  requirements,  including  a  more  granular  analysis  of 
unbundling requirements by the states when appropriate.” 
11 http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html 10 
Because  some  policies  are  explicitly  aimed  at  increasing  rural  broadband  access,  I 
construct a separate variable intended to capture broadband access in rural areas.  Each year the 
FCC reports the number of high-speed service providers in each zip code.  The U.S. Census, 
meanwhile, reports the rural and urban population of each zip code.  Together, these two sources 
make it possible to calculate the share of each state’s rural population that lives in zip codes with 
a given number of high-speed providers. 
These  data  on  rural  penetration  have  certain  limitations.    First,  while  the  broadband 
penetration figures above are based on estimates of the number of broadband subscribers, it is 
important to emphasize that this rural data is based on the number of people who live in zip 
codes with a given number of broadband providers.  While we can be reasonably certain that 
nobody in zip codes with zero providers has broadband (except possibly via satellite), for zip 
codes with at least one provider we have no way of what share of the population has access and 
what share of those with access actually subscribe.  Second, for confidentiality reasons, the FCC 
often reports that “one to three” firms, rather than a specific number, provide broadband service 
in a zip code.  I focus on whether policies affect the share of the rural population with access to 
at  least  one  broadband  provider.    Third,  the  zip  code  population  figures  and  rural-urban 
breakdown come from the 2000 Census, so they do not change over time.  Only the number of 
broadband providers in each zip code changes over time.  The constant population is unlikely to 
cause problems in the analysis as the share of a state’s population that is rural should not change 
dramatically from year to year. 
 
Analysis: Policies and Broadband Penetration 
To  evaluate  the  effects  of  broadband  policies,  I  regress  the  various  measures  of 
broadband  penetration  on  the  policy  and  control  variables.    In  particular,  I  estimate  several 
versions of equation (1): 
(1)  it t it it CLEC y             + + + + + = ) ( ) ( ) variables policy ( 2 i 1 0 it Z  
Where yit is the number of broadband subscribers per capita in state i in year t.  The 
policy  variables  are  dummies  indicating  whether  the  state  specifically  grants  telecom  firms 
access to public rights-of-way; whether cable companies are excluded from these  state-level 
rights-of-way  regulations;  whether  the  state  limits  municipal  deployment  of  broadband 
                                                                                                                                                            
12 http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html 11 
infrastructure, uses universal service mechanisms to stimulate broadband, offers grants or loans 
to private providers to offer broadband in “underserved” areas, offers grants or loans to private 
providers to offer broadband in rural areas, and offers tax incentives to broadband providers.  
Note that because the data sources do not indicate when states adopted these policies, the policy 
variables do not vary over time.  For purposes of analysis, I assume that these policies were in 
effect from the year 2000 in all states.  CLECit is a vector of two variables: the share of telephone 
lines in a state-year provided by CLECs as UNE-P lines, and the share of telephone lines in a 
state-year that are provided by CLECs under resale programs. 
Zit is a vector of control variables intended to capture aspects of demand for broadband 
and  costs  of  supplying  broadband.    Demand  variables  include  median  household  income, 
urbanization, population, and private venture capital.
13  As a proxy for the cost of provision I 
include  the  share  of  the  population  that  lives  in  urban  areas  because  it  is  presumably  less 
expensive to provide broadband in areas where people are more densely concentrated.  I include 
the  party  of  the  state’s  governor  to  control  for  political  factors  that  may  influence  rollout.  
Finally, year fixed effects control for the time trend—crucial for a new technology that is being 
rapidly adopted across the country regardless of policies. 
Because policies may be correlated—that is, a state may be more likely to enact one 
policy when it has another—I first estimate the equation including all the policy variables, and 
then estimate it for each variable separately as a robustness check.  In addition, I estimate the 
effects of each policy variable separately on three measures of broadband access: total broadband 
lines per capita, ADSL lines per capita, and coaxial cable lines per capita. 
Tables  2  and  3  show  the  results  of  estimating  this  series  of  equations  using  ordinary  least 
squares.  Table 2 shows the results of estimating the equation with all policy variables included 
simultaneously, while Table 3 shows the results of separate regressions for each policy variable 
as a robustness check.  Access to public rights-of-way, consistent with the discussion above, is 
statistically  significantly  correlated  with  broadband  penetration.    Interpreted  causally,  the 
coefficient suggests that mandated access to rights-of-way can increase broadband penetration by 
                                                 
13  Income, urbanization, and population come from the U.S. Census.   The venture capital data comes from the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  MoneyTree  survey  (http://www.pwcmoneytree.com/moneytree/index.jsp).    I  also  tried 
including other demand shifters in the analysis, including education, the share of people with no telephone, poverty 
indicators, and shares of a state’s population in different industrial sectors.  These variables, however, are correlated 
with each other and the variables discussed above included in the regression.  I ultimately excluded these because 12 
0.006 lines per capita, or about ten percent when evaluated at the mean in the dataset.  Likewise, 
denying cable companies those same rights is correlated with lower broadband penetration.  The 
coefficients suggest that excluding cable companies from these regulations is correlated with 
0.009 fewer total lines per capita or 0.01 fewer cable broadband lines per capita.  The effect on 
cable lines appears quite large since the mean per capita number of cable broadband lines is only 
0.04.
14  This result on cable lines, however, is not robust.  When the equation includes only the 
rights-of-way  variables  and  not  the  other  policy  variables,  the  effect  of  cable  rights-of-way 
becomes statistically insignificant and the magnitude of the coefficient is much smaller. 
The results on other state policies are mixed.  Using “universal service mechanisms” does 
not  appear  to  increase  broadband  penetration.    In  fact,  the  analysis  shows  a  statistically 
significant  negative  correlation  between  using  universal  service  mechanisms  and  broadband 
penetration, with the negative effect coming from the large negative impact on cable broadband 
penetration.  This result is sensible: universal service programs typically benefit (and directly 
cost) only telecommunications firms.  A program that uses universal service funds to promote 
broadband may subsidize ADSL at the expense of cable.  In other words, these programs are 
likely  to  treat  different  delivery  methods  (ADSL  and  cable)  of  the  same  good  (broadband 
connection) differently, distorting investment and competition.  The negative result on universal 
service programs is consistent with Aron and Burnstein’s (2003) argument that policies that 
favor one type of investment over another can be self-defeating and “frustrate policy objectives 
to increase adoption.” 
Private sector grants and loans to “underserved” areas appear to be either ineffectual or 
detrimental to broadband rollout.  Tax incentives have either no impact or a slightly negative 
impact on broadband rollout, though the negative result is not robust.  While loans targeted at 
rural areas do not appear to be effective, grants targeted at rural areas are statistically significant 
and correlated with increases in broadband penetration.  I will explore the rural issue in more 
depth below. 
State laws limiting cities’ ability to provide broadband appear to have little impact.  The 
coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant.  Recall that proponents of these laws 
                                                                                                                                                            
the included variables seemed more likely to capture underlying demand conditions, and including these did not 
affect the main results but made it difficult to interpret the coefficients on the control variables. 
14 Note that this broadband penetration figure seems low because it is an average of all years from 2000, when 
penetration was fairly low, to 2004. 13 
argue that broadband providers are more likely to invest if they know that the government will 
not expropriate or undercut their services by, for example, subsidizing the cost of broadband 
provision  through  taxes.    The  concern  is  legitimate.    Reducing  the  returns  to  providers’ 
investments also reduces their incentive to innovate.  Contrarily, though, it is also possible that 
some government investments would be complements to private networks or that government-
owned networks act as competition, spurring additional private investment.  Unfortunately, the 
results here provide comfort to neither side: the presence of laws restricting municipal provision 
of broadband services is not statistically significantly correlated with broadband penetration. 
Unbundling regulations also appear to matter for broadband rollout.  The share of UNE 
lines is statistically significantly negatively correlated with ADSL rollout.  In other words, the 
larger the share of telephone lines in a state provided under the UNE regulations, the slower the 
rollout of ADSL.  This result is consistent with the claims of UNE-P critics that those regulations 
reduced ILEC investment.  Contrarily, the share of lines provided by CLECs under total service 
resale (TSR) is statistically significantly positively correlated with total broadband penetration, 
ADSL penetration, and (weakly) cable penetration. 
It is difficult to interpret the positive result on the share of lines provided through TSR.  It 
may  indicate  that  resale  competition  from  CLECs  stimulated  ILEC  investment.    The  result, 
however, may also simply be reinforcing the negative UNE result.  That is, the share of TSR 
lines will be higher in states in with relatively higher ratios of regulated UNE prices to TSR 
prices.  If UNE discourages investment and high TSR proxies for low UNE, then a positive result 




Among the control variables, household income and urbanization are generally positively 
correlated with broadband penetration, as one would expect.  Venture capital was, surprisingly, 
not  statistically  significant.    Having  a  Republican  governor  was  negatively  and  statistically 
significantly correlated with broadband penetration. 
 
Rural penetration 
The analysis above suggested that some policies aimed at increasing rural broadband 
penetration may have been successful.  I investigate that result more carefully here by explicitly 
                                                 
15 I thank Tom Hazlett for pointing this out to me. 14 
testing the effects of policies on rural, as opposed to total, penetration.  I re-estimate equation (1) 
with two changes.  First, I include two new policy variables: the amount of money provided to 
each state each year under USDA’s Rural Development broadband program and the amount 
provided under USDA’s broader telecommunications program.
16  Second, the dependent variable 
becomes the number of rural dwellers in zip codes with at least one broadband provider, as 
discussed above.  More specifically, because the main policy variable of interest is the flow of 
USDA Rural Development dollars, I use changes in the rural population with broadband access 
as the dependent variable.  That is, it seems more appropriate to examine the effects of a flow of 
dollars on changes in the number with access, rather than the total number of people with access, 
since a sudden stop in the flow of subsidies could affect the number of people who gain access, 
but not the number that already have it. 
Table  4  shows  the  results  of  estimating  this  equation.    None  of  the  state  policies, 
including  those  specifically  targeted  at  rural  areas,  is  correlated  with  improvements  in  this 
measure of rural service.  The USDA’s broadband program is also not statistically correlated 
with improvements in rural broadband access.  USDA’s broader telecom program, however, is 
robustly statistically significantly correlated with improvements in rural access.  Regardless of 
which variables are included or excluded, these telecom subsidies are positively correlated with 
increases in the rural population with access to at least one broadband provider. 
The results suggest that the Rural Development telecommunications program, if not the 
broadband component of it, is promoting rural broadband adoption, but additional analysis is 
required  to  assess  whether  it  is  a  cost-effective  way  of  increasing  access.    The  coefficient 
estimates suggest that for each $1000 invested by the telecommunications program, an additional 
0.6 – 0.7 people gain access.  That is, the program spends on average about $1428 - $1667 per 
additional person who gains access to at least one broadband provider. 
This estimate, however, is problematic.  Several factors may bias the estimate towards 
making the program appear either less or more cost-effective than it is in reality.  Consider the 
ways the analysis might make the program appear less cost-effective.  First, the estimate is based 
on expenditures by the Rural Development program’s telecommunications program excluding 
amounts specifically aimed at broadband.  While access to telecommunications services can be a 
                                                 
16  More  specifically,  one  variable  is  state-year  broadband  funding,  and  the  second  variable  is  state-year 
telecommunications funding less the amount designated specifically for broadband. 15 
prerequisite for broadband access, broadband access was not a primary focus of the program 
until recently.  It is possible, therefore, that any increased broadband access from this part of the 
telecommunications program is just a happy byproduct of the program’s true intent. 
Second, while people living in zip codes with no broadband providers almost surely have 
no broadband access, the share of the population living in such zip codes understates the number 
of people who do not have broadband and probably underestimates the number of people who 
could not access broadband even if they wanted to.  In other words, the estimate may overstate 
the subsidies targeted at broadband and undercount the number of potential beneficiaries. 
Other factors, however, bias the estimate in the other direction, making it appear more 
cost-effective than it actually is.  First, the analysis explores the effects of the program on the 
number of people living in zip codes with at least one broadband provider.  When a broadband 
provider  begins  operating  in  a  zip  code,  it  will  not  necessarily  be  accessible  by  the  entire 
population  and  not  everyone  with  access  will  subscribe,  meaning  that  the  dollars  spent  per 
person who then becomes a broadband consumer is probably higher than this estimate suggests.  
Second, while the USDA’s program funds telecommunications, the first broadband provider in a 
zip code might be one, like cable, that does not receive subsidies from the USDA program.  In 
that case, this analysis would mistakenly attribute the increase in access to the USDA program.  
In other words, the estimate may overstate the number of people who gain access to broadband 
and the number of providers supported by this program.   
While the analysis in this paper does not find a significant correlation between USDA 
broadband spending and broadband access, USDA Rural Development (2005) claims that “Since 
2001, Rural Development has utilized a variety of loan and loan guarantee programs to provide 
over $3 billion in funding and assist over 1.3 million rural subscribers in accessing broadband.”  
The report does not provide any details on how the number 1.3 million was determined, or 
whether any empirical testing was done to determine whether the program itself was responsible 
for making broadband available to those 1.3 million people. 
However, taking USDA’s numbers at face value implies that USDA Rural Development 
spent  about  $2,300  per  person  connected.    USDA’s  numbers  thus  seem  to  suggest  that  the 16 
program is not cost effective.  For the same cost, for example, USDA could have paid for all 1.3 
million people to subscribe to satellite broadband services for nearly five years.
17 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
As  the  debate  over  U.S.  broadband  adoption  rages,  cities,  states,  and  the  federal 
government  continue  to  adopt  policies  aimed  at  increasing  broadband  penetration.   To  date, 
however, there has been little analysis of the effectiveness of such programs, especially at the 
sub-national level.  In this paper I combine broadband and telecommunications data from the 
FCC  with  information  on  state-level  policies  compiled  by  the  California  Public  Utilities 
Commission, information on rights-of-way from the U.S. Department of Commerce, data on 
rural  telecommunications  grants  from  the  USDA  Rural  Development  Program,  and  the  US 
Census to test the effects of various policies on broadband penetration. 
The  analysis  reveals  that  most  state-level  policies  are  ineffective.    Universal  service 
mechanisms and programs targeted at “underserved” areas do not boost broadband penetration 
and may even slow it, possibly by giving an artificial advantage to one type of provider over 
another.    Likewise,  tax  incentives  appear  to  have  no  impact.    Laws  limiting  municipal 
deployment  of  broadband  are  not  statistically  significantly  correlated  with  broadband 
penetration. 
Unbundling regulations, meanwhile, have a mixed effect on broadband penetration.  UNE 
lines  are  negatively  correlated  with  broadband  penetration,  consistent  with  claims  that  UNE  
regulations deterred investment.  Resale of telephone lines by CLECs, however, was correlated 
with  increases  in  broadband  penetration,  perhaps  suggesting  that  CLECs  did  provide  some 
competition, but not through UNE lines. 
Some policies appear to have a positive impact on broadband penetration.  Access to 
rights-of-way  matters  a  great  deal:  guaranteed  access  to  public  rights-of-way  is  strongly 
correlated with increases in broadband penetration.  These results support calls by the California 
PUC  and  the  National  Association  of  Regulatory  Utility  Commissioners  to  simplify  and 
standardize regulations regarding rights-of-way.  Likewise, some programs targeted at rural areas 
                                                 
17 Starband Residential, for example currently offers a package that includes equipment and two years of service for 
$599, and then $49.95 per month for the third year.  http://www.starband.com/residential/pricing.asp (last accessed 17 
may have a positive effect.  Expenditures by USDA’s Rural Development broadband program 
are not correlated with increases in broadband access, but expenditures from USDA’s broader 
telecommunications program are, though it does not appear to be cost-effective.  While I find no 
significant correlation between broadband subsidies and rural access, USDA’s own numbers 
imply that the broadband program has spent nearly $2300 per person connected.  An analysis 
here of the broader telecommunications program suggests that it spends about $1500 for each 
person who gains access to—but does not necessarily purchase—broadband service. 
The analysis in this paper is not without problems, however.  First, I do not currently 
know when the state programs took effect and simply assume that these programs were in effect 
from the year 2000 onwards.  Knowing the year each state began its programs would provide for 
more rigorous testing of their effectiveness and allow the  analysis to  control for state fixed 
effects.  Second, the state policy variables are dummy variables indicating only whether or not a 
state has a particular type of policy.  These dummy variables mask differences in each state’s 
approach and contain no information as to the  size—relative or absolute—of each program.  
Third, as discussed above, the rural data are problematic in that they show only the number of 
people who live in rural parts of zip codes with no broadband providers.  The true number of 
people in rural areas without access may be different. 
Endogeneity may also be a problem.  For example, the negative coefficient on using 
universal service mechanisms to increase broadband could mean either that the program slows 
broadband penetration or, contrarily, that perhaps states with slower broadband adoption are the 
ones that use these tools to address the issue.    However, I believe that in this case reverse 
causality is unlikely for two reasons.  First, I control for many of the factors that explain low 
penetration, like income and urbanization.  Second, because universal service mechanisms are 
generally used for telecommunications but not cable companies, one would expect to see some 
correlation with ADSL penetration if reverse causality were a problem.  Instead, the negative 
correlation is primarily with cable modem, not ADSL, penetration.  It seems less likely that 
policymakers would turn to a tool targeted at telecommunications companies in response to slow 
growth in cable modems.  
Despite  its  weaknesses,  however,  this  paper  provides  empirical  evidence  on  the 
effectiveness of a number of policies aimed at increasing broadband.  Some policies matter a lot.  
                                                                                                                                                            
June 24, 2005).  18 
Access to rights-of-way is, not surprisingly, important in boosting broadband access.  Most state 
initiatives do not have the desired effect and some—those that use the universal service program 
and those that target “underserved” areas—may even be counterproductive.  State laws blocking 
municipal broadband have little impact, positive or negative, on broadband penetration.  Some 
programs targeted at rural areas appear to boost broadband penetration, but the analysis suggests 
that  they  may  not  be  cost-effective.    Telecommunications  unbundling  regulations  have  an 
impact, as well: UNE regulations appear to hinder investment in broadband while non-UNE 
resale seemed to boost broadband penetration, perhaps through competition provided by CLECs. 
Overall, the analysis reveals that not all policies intended to boost broadband penetration 
actually do.  Some policies intended to make a state more broadband-friendly could have the 
unintended consequence of deterring investment by broadband providers.  On the other hand, 
some policies do appear to induce additional investment and boost penetration.  Further research 
should explore these in more depth to better determine under what conditions certain policies are 








Has an E-government initiative  51 




Offers  private-sector  grants  targeted  to 
deployment in underserved areas 
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Offers  private-sector  grants  targeted  to 
deployment in rural areas 
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Has expedited rights-of-way policies 
  13 
Offers  private-sector  loans  targeted  to 
deployment in underserved areas 
 
12 
Uses  universal  service  mechanisms  to 
attract broadband deployment 
 
8 
Offers loans to broadband providers 
  7 
Offers grants to broadband providers 
  4 
Has a definition for “advanced services” 
  2 
Regulates broadband service-quality 
  2 
Sets rates for broadband services 
  0 
Note:  Number of states includes the District of Columbia. 
Source: Derived from California Public Utilities 
Commission (2005). 20 
 
Table 2 
Broadband Penetration and Government Policies 
All policy variables included simultaneously 
           
  Broadband per capita 
   Total  ADSL  Cable 
0.006  0.002  0.002 
Telecom companies guaranteed access to rights-of-way 
(3.01)**  (1.48)  (1.16) 
-0.009  0.001  -0.015 
Cable companies exempt from state rights-of-way regs 
(2.44)*  (0.32)  (3.43)** 
-0.003  -0.001  -0.003 
State limits municipal deployment of broadband services 
(1.53)  (0.53)  (1.30) 
-0.006  0.002  -0.006  State  uses  universal  service  mechanisms  to  attract  broadband 
deployment  (2.15)*  (1.18)  (2.24)* 
-0.010  -0.004  -0.006  State  offer  private-sector  grants  targeted  to  deployment  in 
underserved areas  (2.93)**  (1.52)  (1.92)+ 
-0.003  0.000  -0.006  State  offers  private-sector  loans  targeted  to  deployment  in 
underserved areas  (0.60)  (0.10)  (1.14) 
0.011  -0.002  0.021  State  offers  private-sector  grants  targeted  to  deployment  in  rural 
areas  (2.29)*  (0.57)  (3.49)** 
State offers tax incentives to broadband providers  -0.003  0.002  -0.005 21 
  (0.95)  (0.94)  (1.41) 
-0.002  -0.037  0.012 
Share UNE lines 
(0.05)  (1.69)+  (0.35) 
0.344  0.136  0.197 
Share CLEC resold lines 
(3.57)**  (1.92)+  (1.53) 
0.000  0.000  -0.000 
Population 
(0.14)  (1.64)  (3.07)** 
0.072  0.050  0.041 
Share state's population urban 
(7.26)**  (7.13)**  (2.64)* 
-0.004  -0.004  0.000 
Republican governor 
(2.01)*  (3.00)**  (0.18) 
0.001  -0.000  0.001 
Median household income 
(2.52)*  (1.58)  (2.78)** 
-0.004  -0.005  0.002 
Venture capital per capita 
(0.74)  (1.15)  (0.33) 
-0.032  -0.012  -0.026 
Constant 
(3.66)**  (1.89)+  (2.69)** 
Observations  133  112  94 
R-squared  0.89  0.74  0.84 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
Year fixed effects included in all regressions       22 
 
Table 3 Table 3 (continued)
Broadband Penetration and Government Policies Broadband Penetration and Government Policies
Each policy variable included separately Each policy variable included separately
Broadband per capita Broadband per capita Broadband per capita Broadband per capita











0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(1.09) (0.39) (2.01)* (0.75) (0.44) (2.10)* (0.57) (0.38) (2.28)* (0.73) (0.85) (2.11)*
0.055 0.040 0.052 0.057 0.039 0.044 0.056 0.039 0.044 0.056 0.038 0.044
(6.12)** (7.10)** (3.36)** (6.35)** (7.34)** (2.91)** (6.32)** (7.27)** (2.91)** (6.23)** (7.23)** (2.90)**
-0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.001
(2.25)* (3.21)** (0.48) (1.92)+ (3.27)** (0.69) (1.94)+ (3.39)** (0.83) (1.95)+ (2.97)** (0.60)
0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(3.63)** (0.60) (2.05)* (3.29)** (0.67) (2.09)* (3.48)** (0.89) (2.58)* (3.27)** (0.47) (2.20)*
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.006
(0.21) (0.40) (0.60) (0.14) (0.46) (0.89) (0.02) (0.77) (0.56) (0.18) (0.03) (0.93)
-0.027 -0.010 -0.027 -0.024 -0.009 -0.023 -0.028 -0.008 -0.027 -0.024 -0.009 -0.024
(3.81)** (2.11)* (3.13)** (3.35)** (2.00)* (2.64)** (3.56)** (1.60) (2.96)** (3.30)** (2.01)* (2.66)**
Observations 192 138 106 196 142 110 196 142 110 196 142 110
R-squared 0.79 0.63 0.70 0.78 0.64 0.68 0.78 0.63 0.69 0.78 0.64 0.68
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%


















Venture capital per capita
Constant
Share UNE lines
Share CLEC resold lines
Population
Share state's population urban
State offer private-sector grants targeted to 
deployment in underserved areas
State offers private-sector loans targeted to 
deployment in underserved areas
State offers private-sector grants targeted to 
deployment in rural areas
State offers tax incentives to broadband 
providers
Telecom companies guaranteed access to 
rights-of-way
Cable companies exempt from state rights-of-
way regs
State limits municipal deployment of 
broadband services
State uses universal service mechanisms to 
attract broadband deployment23 
Table 3 (continued)
Broadband Penetration and Government Policies
Each policy variable included separately
Broadband per capita Broadband per capita Broadband per capita Broadband per capita











0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.84) (0.52) (2.05)* (0.44) (0.73) (2.52)* (0.82) (0.37) (2.09)* (0.71) (0.62) (1.78)+
0.056 0.039 0.044 0.056 0.040 0.042 0.056 0.039 0.044 0.077 0.052 0.024
(6.26)** (7.26)** (2.87)** (6.32)** (7.54)** (2.87)** (6.39)** (7.32)** (2.89)** (7.25)** (7.77)** (1.54)
-0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 0.000
(1.86)+ (3.24)** (0.72) (2.12)* (3.05)** (0.21) (1.84)+ (3.29)** (0.72) (2.70)** (4.03)** (0.17)
0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(3.39)** (0.66) (2.20)* (3.24)** (0.68) (2.54)* (3.15)** (0.81) (2.23)* (0.49) (1.75)+ (1.43)
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.004
(0.14) (0.45) (0.82) (0.37) (0.12) (1.46) (0.17) (0.56) (0.86) (0.26) (0.47) (0.61)
-0.024 -0.009 -0.023 -0.024 -0.010 -0.026 -0.022 -0.008 -0.024 -0.022 -0.014 -0.011
(3.37)** (1.94)+ (2.58)* (3.34)** (2.11)* (3.07)** (3.06)** (1.83)+ (2.65)** (2.49)* (2.38)* (1.22)
Observations 196 142 110 196 142 110 196 142 110 137 116 98
R-squared 0.78 0.64 0.68 0.78 0.64 0.70 0.78 0.64 0.68 0.86 0.71 0.77
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Year fixed effects included in all regressions
Median household income
Venture capital per capita
Constant
Share CLEC resold lines
Population
Share state's population urban
Republican governor
Telecom companies guaranteed access to rights-
of-way
Cable companies exempt from state rights-of-
way regs
State limits municipal deployment of broadband 
services
State uses universal service mechanisms to 
attract broadband deployment
State offer private-sector grants targeted to 
deployment in underserved areas
State offers private-sector loans targeted to 
deployment in underserved areas
State offers private-sector grants targeted to 
deployment in rural areas





Policies and Rural Broadband Availability

















0.63 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.71
(2.96)** (3.36)** (3.29)** (3.32)** (3.38)** (3.40)** (3.39)** (3.39)**
0.51 0.55 0.51 0.55 0.66 0.57 0.61 0.59
(0.66) (0.74) (0.68) (0.72) (0.88) (0.77) (0.81) (0.79)
56180 2793 90439 89511 84373 74222 85890 77927
(0.33) (0.02) (0.58) (0.56) (0.54) (0.47) (0.53) (0.49)
-218408 -467145 -395572 -418127 -373437 -430311 -389978 -415652
(0.45) (1.05) (0.88) (0.92) (0.82) (0.95) (0.83) (0.91)
-88359 -90743 -72336 -68111 -65635 -66833 -67357 -67763
(1.76)+ (1.86)+ (1.49) (1.41) (1.35) (1.38) (1.38) (1.40)
-1180 -3619 -3455 -3153 -1087 -3772 -2614 -2870
(0.11) (0.35) (0.34) (0.31) (0.10) (0.36) (0.25) (0.28)
-809878 1220 -396766 -413176 -211452 -246185 -271495 -224301
(0.67) (0.00) (0.38) (0.37) (0.21) (0.24) (0.26) (0.22)
8627436 11668310 -820958 -4475378 -20810000 -9438282 -12600000 -10780000
(0.15) (0.22) (0.01) (0.08) (0.37) (0.17) (0.23) (0.20)
0.034 0.032 0.028 0.03 0.031 0.029 0.03 0.029
(4.63)** (5.02)** (4.31)** (4.66)** (4.62)** (4.50)** (4.66)** (4.64)**
109796 85020 92846 91010 81509 84630 85193 83588
(2.01)* (1.76)+ (1.89)+ (1.78)+ (1.67)+ (1.75)+ (1.76)+ (1.69)+
Observations 103 103 106 106 106 106 106 106
R-squared 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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